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 This paper examines why the countries of Northeast Asia (China, Korea, and Japan) in the early 
nineteenth century traded much less (as measured by the proportion of trade to GDP) than most 
countries in other parts of the world. It is argued that the most important reason for this are 
government policies that suppressed private trade. It is shown that these restrictive trade policies 
were designed to maximize the total net benefit from trade, covering not only economic net benefits 
but also non-economic benefits in the fields of diplomacy, defense, culture, and internal politics.  
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Foreign trade has played an important role in the economic development of most countries. 
Yet, countries in pre-industrial Northeast Asia relied to a much lesser extent on trade than most 
countries in other parts of the world. Although a direct comparison of the share of trade in GDP of 
pre-industrial countries is difficult, it does seem clear (as Section II will show) that this share was 
very low in China, Japan, and Korea during the early nineteenth century.1 This raises the question: 
why was the share of trade in GDP so low in the three Northeast Asian countries just before they 
opened their doors to the Western world? And why can such significant regional and intertemporal 
differences in trade ratios be observed in world history? The aim of this paper is to answer these 
questions.  
There are various factors that potentially explain the regional and intertemporal differences 
in trade shares, including geographic factors, economic factors (such as technology, markets, factor 
endowments, etc.), political factors, and cultural factors. Which factor is the most important is 
likely to vary depending on the period and region. It seems likely that the more immature a 
country’s or region’s level of technological and market development, the stronger is the role of 
geography in explaining any differences.  
A scholar stressing the role of geographical factors is Diamond (1997), who suggests, for 
example, that Europe’s highly-articulated coastline gave rise to flourishing trade, while China’s 
smooth coastline was less conducive to trade. However, I will argue that by the eighteenth century, 
geography was not the main reason for the low trade-to-GDP ratio of Northeast Asian countries, for 
the following reasons. First, although Northeast Asia’s geography was less favorable than Europe’s, 
it was not bad for trade growth. Wang (2000, pp. 1-2), for example, argues that the South China Sea 
“looked like a small Mediterranean Sea,” though “more open and more dangerous.” Korea has the 
geographical advantage of being a peninsular country, while Japan has that of being an archipelago. 
Second, all the Northeast Asian countries – China, Korea, Japan, and Ryukyu – at one stage or 
another enjoyed prospering maritime trade, and China, Korea, and Japan have flourishing trade 
sectors today. In other words, by the Middle Ages, geographical constraints had clearly become 
surmountable. A third reason, finally, is that restrictive trade policies played an important role in   2
discouraging trade activities in the Northeast Asian countries. The second and third reasons are 
discussed in greater detail in Section III.  
This paper shows that not only economic and geographic factors but also policy factors play 
a part in explaining the marked difference in trade from other regions. Of course, policies were 
influenced by economic and geographic factors, but they were not determined by them completely. 
Restrictive trade policies such as maritime bans (海禁) that forbade any private maritime trade 
independent of diplomatic missions, or in the case of Japan and Korea, national seclusion (鎖國) 
that forbade any exchange with Westerners, played a significant role in restricting the trade of the 
three Northeast Asian countries just before they opened their doors to the Western World.  
This raises the question why the countries of pre-industrial Northeast Asia tended to adopt 
restrictive and passive trade policies. The answer is related to the reason why these countries 
adopted the Chinese tribute (朝貢) system, since the tributary relations functioned as a network of 
trade, and trade expanded via these relations (Hamashita 1990, p. 34). Under the tribute system, 
trade was subject to diplomacy, and economic gains from trade often were sacrificed for the sake of 
diplomatic ends such as the maintenance of suzerainty (宗主權) or border security. 
Influential explanations of restrictive trade policies in China tend to stress culture as a  
factor. Fairbank (1968), for instance, thought that China’s cultural superiority lay at the core of the 
tribute system, while Fairbank and Goldman (1998, p. 139) summarized Ming (明, 1368-1644) 
China’s withdrawal from the maritime world as follows: “In short, anticommercialism and 
xenophobia won out.[…] The contradiction between Ming China’s superior capacity for maritime 
expansion and conservative Neo-Confucian throttling of it suggests that Ming China almost 
purposely missed the boat of modern technological and economic development.” Landes (1998, p. 
97) similarly argued that “the Confucian state abhorred mercantile success.” Another scholar to 
stress the cultural factor is Wang (2000), who – contrasting “earthbound China” with the “maritime 
enterprise of Europe” – suggested that it is the “continental mind-set” of the Chinese that explains 
why they were not actively pursuing maritime advances. However, as indicated above, the argument 
of this paper is that the trade policies of pre-industrial China were the outcome of rational choice, 
and culture generally was not a major but a minor factor underlying the policies.    
Scholars concentrating on economic factors to explain China’s indifference in the 
eighteenth century to maritime advances and colonization include Pomeranz and Topik (1999, pp. 
10-1).  They argue that the Chinese state had little incentive to trade, because it had no neighbors of 
comparable might and ran budget surpluses through most of the 1700s. Moreover, Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                     
1 In this paper, “trade” means international trade when a territorial state existed, or external trade   3
merchants also had little incentive because they faced a big domestic market. However, the 
argument I will put forward here is that the trade policies of pre-industrial China can be explained 
more effectively by the country’s political economy rather than by economic or political factors 
alone.  
Attempts to explain Chinese trade based on political economy are nothing new. Wallerstein 
(1974, pp. 52-63), for instance, argued that China did not show any interest in overseas expansion 
analogous to the European countries because China was a vast empire and, moreover, was able to 
solve its food problem by expanding rice production internally.  Meanwhile, Wong (1998, chap. 6), 
suggested that China’s strong and unitary state was able to manage fiscal flows over far greater 
distances than European states and therefore faced fewer pressures to tap revenue sources abroad. In 
this paper, I present a theoretical political economy approach to show that pre-industrial Northeast 
Asia’s policies to suppress private trade were designed to maximize the total net benefit from trade, 
covering not only the economic net benefit but also diplomatic and internal political aspects, 
defense issues, and cultural goods and services. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides evidence on 
the low levels of trade of China, Japan, and Korea in the early nineteenth century when compared 
with other regions of the world. Section III outlines the evolution of world trade in the pre-industrial 
era, dividing it into four phases, and describes the characteristics of trade in the Northeast Asian 
region. The close examination of trends in world trade also reveals the determinants of these trends. 
Section IV presents a theory of trade policy that has been developed to explain the trade of pre-
industrial Korea and Chinese (Lee and Temin 2004; 2005). Section V applies the theory to trade 
policies in pre-industrial Northeast Asia, explaining both instances of trade restriction as well as of 




II. Intertemporal and Regional Differences in Trade Dependency Rates 
 
This section provides a detailed examination and comparison of the trade dependency rates 
of various countries and regions around the world. Table 1 shows that the regional variation in the 
ratio of the trade volume to GDP in the world around 1870 was considerable and that it has 
narrowed since then.  Moreover, the table indicates that the ratio of merchandise exports to GDP 
around 1870 was especially low in Northeast Asia, while it was especially high in Western Europe.  
                                                                                                                                                     
between communities when no territorial state had been established.   4
 
Table 1:  Merchandise Exports as a Percentage of GDP in 1990 Prices 
 1870  1950  1998 
Western Europe 
Western Offshoots 
Eastern Europe and former USSR 
Latin America 
Asia 
   China 
   Japan 
   Korea 




































Sources: Maddison (2001), except for the figure for Korea in 1870, which is explained in the text. 
Note: 1. The figures for China and Japan in 1870 are likely to understate actual export ratios,  
as is also explained in the text.  
2. Western Offshoots include the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.  
 
The share of trade in Korea’s GDP is estimated to have been about 2.5% during the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries –the highest share in the country’s history before the 
opening of the economy to trade with the modern world. The major reason for this was Korea’s role 
as an entrepôt for transit trade between Japan and China based on the massive inflow of Japanese 
silver. However, trade contracted in the eighteenth century, mainly due to the interruption of silver 
imports from Japan, and the share dropped to an estimated 1.5% in the nineteenth century before the 
opening of the economy. The share may have exceeded 1% from the late sixteenth century owing to 
the increase in Japanese silver inflows.  Before then, it seems to have exceeded 1% only in the ninth 
century (Lee 2004).  
The share of trade in China’s GDP has been estimated at 1.5% around 1700 and 1800, while 
for England the equivalent share around 1700 was 26% (Kishimoto 1997, p. 206). In Japan, 
overseas trade grew steadily from the twelfth to the early seventeenth century. The share of trade in 
GDP is estimated to have been about 5% in the early seventeenth century, followed by a decrease to 
about 1% in the late seventeenth century and a further decrease to about 0.3% in the early 
nineteenth century.2 Thus, just before China and Japan opened their doors to the modern world, the 
GDP share of trade in these two countries was almost the same as the figures for 1870 in Table 1. 
                                                 
2 Nishikawa (1985, p. 45) has estimated the share of exports in farm output measured in units of koku 
(實收石高). The estimated farm output in 1872 (Hayami and Miyamoto 1988, p. 44) was 1.8 times 
the rice output in 1874 estimated by the Meiji government. As the share of rice output valued at 
market prices in GNP was 24% in Japan during 1885-88 (Ohkawa and Miyohei 1979, Tables A7 and 
A16), farm output in 1872 is computed to have been 43% of GDP. The Meiji government seems to 
have slightly underestimated the rice output in 1874, and the share of rice output in GNP seems to   5
Based on the above, it is safe to say that in the early nineteenth century, just before China, 
Japan, and Korea opened their doors to the modern world, the share of trade in GDP in the 
Northeast Asian countries was very low. In the case of Japan and Korea, the trade shares were 
especially low when taking into account that Korea is a peninsular country, Japan is an archipelago, 
and both countries are far smaller than China.  
However, China, Japan, and Korea all experienced rapid increases in trade after opening 
their doors to the modern world in the mid-nineteenth century.  As for Japan, the proportion of 
exports of goods and services and factor income received from abroad in gross national expenditure 
was 2.6% by 1885 (Ohkawa and Miyohei 1979, Table A3). By the end of the twentieth century, the 
share of trade in GDP in the three Northeast Asian countries is no longer low when compared with 
other regions.  
Moreover, these countries once had relatively high rates before the eighteenth century. 
According to the estimates of growth in the volume of world trade and GDP by Maddison (2005, p. 
22), world trade increased 21.3 times during 1500-1820 and 7.7 times during 1820-70, while world 
GDP increased 2.8 times during 1500-1820 and 1.6 times during 1820-70. If we accept Maddison’s 
estimates of merchandise exports as a percentage of GDP in 1870 and growth rate of world trade 
and GDP, the proportion of world exports in GDP is estimated to have been about 1% in 1820 and 
0.1% in 1500. Considering the development of trade before 1500, the gap in growth rates between 
world trade and world GDP estimated by Maddison appears too big. However, it is highly probable 
that the share of world trade in world GDP in 1500 was less than 1%, if we accept his estimate for 
the ratio of merchandise exports to GDP around 1870 in Table 1. These considerations suggest that 
the world did not see a sustained growth in trade before 1500; rather, it was Europe’s discovery of 
sea routes to South Asia and America, as well as the Industrial Revolution, that were crucial to the 
growth of world trade. 
In the early seventeenth century, Japan’s share of trade in GDP certainly was as high as that 
of Western European nations. In addition, it is likely that China, despite its size, had a trade share 
higher than the world average around the thirteenth century, because it more actively engaged in 
trade during this period than in the 1700s. China’s trade experienced a serious retreat at the 
beginning of the Ming dynasty. Korea also experienced a decline in trade in the early Goryeo 
dynasty (高麗, 918-1392) and at the beginning of the Joseon dynasty (朝鮮, 1392-1910). Japan 
experienced the most dramatic decrease in trade from the mid-seventeenth to the early eighteenth 
                                                                                                                                                     
have slightly decreased during 1872-1888 because of industrialization. Thus, I estimate the share of 
farm output in GDP in 1872 as around 40%. It was higher in early Tokugawa Japan.   6
century. These reversals of trade trends in the Northeast Asian countries can explain their small 
trade shares in the early nineteenth century.  
By contrast, Europe and the regions incorporated into the European economy saw a notable 
increase in trade from 1500. Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson (2002) estimate that the volume of 
Atlantic and Mediterranean trade was 8,000 tons in 1500, increasing to 384,000 tons in 1600, 
664,000 tons in 1700, 3,380,000 tons in 1800, and 14,600,000 tons in 1850. This trend indicates that 
there is little doubt that Atlantic trade played a central role in the growth of world trade during 
1500-1850. 
Southeast Asia has experienced sustained trade growth since the fifteenth century, with the 
exception of the second half of the seventeenth century and the second quarter of the twentieth 
century. The average value of clove, pepper, coffee, and sugar exports in 1940 US prices has been 
estimated at US$53,000 in the 1500s, US$2,340,000 in the 1800s, and US$46,392,000 in the 1860s 
just before the beginning of “the high colonial period.” These four export commodities accounted 
for 11% of total exports in the 1630s, and 26% in the 1890s (Reid 1993; Bulbeck et al. 1998). Trade 
growth in Southeast Asia since 1500 was as notable as that in Western Europe.  
India’s trade with Europe followed a growing trend since 1500 (Prakash 1998). However, 
the share of trade in GDP is estimated to have been between 1% and 2% around 1800. It increased 
to a little less than 10% in 1860 (Roy 2006). It thus appears that, as in China, the size of the Indian 
economy meant that the share of trade in GDP remained small before the nineteenth century.  
 
 
III. Trends in Pre-industrial Trade and their Determinants 
 
1. The propensity to trade in human societies 
 
Most regions showed a potentiality to develop trade already at a very primitive stage of 
economic development. Maritime trade began and grew since the Stone Age. In fact, considering 
the very low levels of technology and the little surplus generated, trade in the Stone Age was 
relatively active. Evidence of trade during the Stone Age can be found around the world, including 
the Mediterranean (Curtain 1984, p. 71), Europe (Clarke 1987, pp. 26-7),  South India and 
Southeast Asia (Abu-Lughod 1989, pp. 261, 268), Africa (Curtain 1984, p. 17), and Australia 
(Sharp 1952). Clarke (1987, p. 26), for example, in the European context, observes that “[t]he 
premise of ‘Neolithic self-sufficiency’ is therefore only relatively acceptable, if at all.”    7
Northeast Asia was no exception in showing the potential for trade at a primitive stage of 
economic development. The peoples along China’s coast developed seafaring traditions even before 
the rise of the first Chinese state around 1600 B.C. Therefore, as Levathes (1994, p. 32) observes, 
“China even at this very early point cannot be dismissed as a land-based power with no interest in 
the sea.” Although Japan was isolated from the continent by sea, there has been active exchange 
between Korea and Japan since pre-historic times (Komoto 1987; Yoshino 2004). Hanihara (1987) 
has estimated that more than one million people may have immigrated into Japan between the 
Yayoi period and the eighth century.  Such active human migration must have been accompanied by 
the trading of goods. Iron imports from southern Korea until the fifth century contributed to the 
development of agriculture and the formation of the state in Japan. 
Why did people trade even in the Stone Age? Why did trade come into existence? Adam 
Smith (1776) saw trade as the “consequence of a certain propensity in human nature […] to truck, 
barter, and exchange one thing for another.” Put differently, people trade because they are looking 
for the gains from trade. And such gains from trade could be had even in the Stone Age, because 
peoples or communities differed in their resource or factor endowments.  
Trade has been on a growing trend throughout human history owing to the development of 
technology and markets. But if human beings already in the Neolithic era showed a potential to 
engage in trade, why was the share of trade in world GDP so low before 1500? The most important 
reasons why trade in the pre-industrial era was so small must be economic ones and include the 
following.  First, productivity was still low, so surpluses were small. Second, the development of 
markets was in its infancy and the overwhelming proportion of economic activity was for 
subsistence. Third, transaction costs were high owing to the low level of technological development 
and weak institutions. Another important reason were policies in the pre-industrial era that were in 
general much less favorable to the development of trade than in the industrial era.  
Trends in the growth of trade in the pre-industrial era varied depending on the region. Why 
did the share of trade in GDP show such marked regional differences even as late as the early 
nineteenth century? An inspection of trends in world trade provides some clues to answer this 
question.   
 
 
2. The uneven development of trade in the ancient world and the lag of the Northeast Asian region 
 
In the ancient era (i.e., before the birth of Christ), the region that had achieved the most 
notable development of maritime trade is the Mediterranean region. Although maritime trade in the   8
Mediterranean experienced up and downs, when compared with other regions, growth in trade was 
relatively sustained. Clarke (1987, pp. 54), for example, noted the formation of “regular, long-
distance, two-way commerce on an economically significant scale” circa 900 B.C.  Curtin (1984, p. 
80), similarly, observed that by the fifth century B.C., “a generalized ecumenical or cross-cultural 
set of trade practices was coming into existence in the Greek world.” 
Although other regions also developed trade, they did not see “a generalized ecumenical” 
trade comparable to that in the Mediterranean region probably until the seventh century. The main 
reason for this most likely is that the Mediterranean region had the most favorable geography for 
maritime trade given the seafaring technology available in the ancient period.  
Huge empires came into being both in the Mediterranean region and in China almost 
simultaneously. This development had some effects on world trade and was of utmost importance in 
shaping the trade policies of the Northeast Asian countries. On the one hand, an empire could be 
more self-sufficient than ordinary states, as part of the external trade became internal trade in the 
enlarged territory.3 On the other hand, the rise of the two empires stimulated trade between Europe 
and the Far East.4   
Interestingly, the trade policies of the two empires differed substantially. The Roman 
empire “left trade to private individuals, intervening rarely and guardedly” (Walbank 1987, p. 90). 
In other words, the Roman empire left the tradition of open trade found in the Mediterranean 
unchanged.5 By contrast, the formation of the Chinese empire was responsible for the restrictive 
trade policy that later emerged in Northeast Asia. The Chinese state attached great importance to 
official trade and restricted private trade, especially maritime trade, after the adoption of the tribute 
system in the Han dynasty, under which trade was subject to diplomacy. China’s trade, 
especially maritime trade, was not vigorous until the early Tang (唐, 618-907) (Chen 1991, chap. 1; 
Wang 2003) –  a fact that can be explained by geographic, economic, and policy factors: the sea 
around China is more open and more dangerous than the Mediterranean Sea; China did not have 
many trading partners; and trade policies were restrictive. The establishment of the Bureau of 
                                                 
3 Although the Roman empire was “not insulated from outside contacts,” these contacts “were never 
very significant” (Walbank 1987, p.90). 
4 See, e.g., Curtin (1984, p. 115), who observed: “[B]etween about 200 B.C. and the beginning of the 
Christian era, regular overland trade came into existence across central Asia from China to the eastern 
Mediterranean. Seaborne trade also began over important segments of the whole route from Morocco to 
Japan.”  
5 See, e.g., Curtin (1985, p. 115), who argued: “Up to the late twelfth century, this trade to the east was 
an extension of the relatively free and open trade patterns of the Mediterranean itself.  Then a particular 
group of Muslim Egyptian merchants, called karimi, gained control over eastern trade with government 
support.”    9
Maritime Trade (市舶司) in Guangzhou (廣州) around 714 provided an institution for the 
development of maritime trade in China. However, the Chinese government carefully controlled 
foreign visitors to this biggest port even in the mid-ninth century (Abu-Lughod 1989, p. 335). 
In the Korean peninsula, in a similar way as in China, the formation of territorial states had 
transformed an open-trade system into an administered trade system. During the third and fourth 
centuries A.D., the southeastern coastal region of Korea developed external trade.  Iron produced in 
this region was distributed across the Korean Peninsula and to Japan. This open system of external 
trade collapsed in the fifth century owing to the region’s incorporation into the Silla kingdom (新羅, 
57 BC – 935 AD). In other words, the consolidation of the Three Kingdoms shrunk external trade 
among local powers in the Korean peninsula (Yi 1998). There is no evidence that private maritime 
trade independent of emissary traffic was allowed by the Three Kingdoms. It appears that there 
were bans on maritime trade.  
Turning to Japan, the ritsuryo (律令) state also adopted a restrictive trade policy. Foreign 
traders were restricted entirely to the Dazaifu port in Kyushu. Private Chinese traders had been a 
familiar sight since the first half of the ninth century, although official exchange with China ceased. 
In 911, the state allowed Chinese merchants to come only once every three years because of the 
heavy financial burden of accommodating them as well as fears of piratical incursions and foreign 
attacks. McCullough (1999, p. 87) observes in this context: “The condition under which trade was 
constructed at the port worked further to the disadvantage of merchants, forcing them to sell their 
choicest goods on interest-free credit to the government at prices determined by it. Thus they were 
exposed to the often realized threat of confiscation and placed at the mercy and whim of corrupt 
officials.” In addition, by the second half of the tenth century, unauthorized travel overseas by 
Japanese had also been banned.  
Although historical materials are scant, what is available is sufficient to show that the 
Chinese empires and the Korean territorial states before the ninth century as well as the Japanese 
ritsuryo state before the eleventh century had in common that their trade policies were more 
restrictive of private trade than those of most other regions. Moreover, it is highly likely that the 
restrictive trade policies of Korea and Japan followed, or were influenced by, that of China.  
 
 
3. Convergence in medieval trade development and the growth of Northeast Asian trade 
  
The growth in trade between the East and the West since the rise of Islam in the seventh 
century helped Asia to gradually overcome its geographical disadvantage vis-à-vis Europe in terms   10
of trade development. The gradual development of technology and markets increased the surplus 
available for trade and facilitated long-distance maritime trade, weakening the binding force of 
geography. During the Middle Ages, i.e., before the fourteenth century, all the major Eurasian 
civilizations had developed trade and the gap in trade development had narrowed. 
The Persian Gulf occupied a central position in the trade between East and West before the 
fifteenth century thanks to its strategic location. The Islamic World, and especially Persian sailors, 
dominated the long distance trade between East and West in eastern spices and luxury items, and 
Persian ships appear in Chinese documents frequently and early, including in 671, 712, 720, 727 
and 748 (Chaudhuri 1985, chap. 2; Abu-Lughod 1989; Aulafia 1987). 
Around the thirteenth century, there was a convergence in trade development among the 
different regions of the Eurasian land mass. According to Abu-Lughod, “[b]etween A.D. 1250 and 
1350 an international trade economy was developing that stretched all the way from the 
northwestern Europe to China,” and “similarities between trading partners in the thirteenth century 
far outweighed differences, and, whatever differences appeared, the West lagged behind” (Abu-
Lughod 1989, p. 8 and p. 15). As three centers – Europe, India, and China – emerged as the most 
dynamic and economically productive regions of the world around the thirteenth century, the role of 
the Middle East in world trade experienced a relative decline (Curtin 1984, p. 121). 
A notable development is that Korea, China, Japan, and Ryukyu all developed seaborne 
trade during the Middle Ages and showed the potential to become maritime powers. The first East 
Asian country to achieve substantial maritime advances was Korea. Underlying this trend is the 
weakening of Chinese and Korean state authorities in the late eighth century, which had resulted in 
the shrinkage of tribute trade and the prospering of private maritime trade. Silla traders ran the 
private coastal trade in China and established residence in the country. They also participated in 
trade with Japan, dominating the East Asian sea trade. This vigor in seaborne private trade was 
unique in the history of pre-industrial Korea. The most prominent figure of this period was Jang Bo-
go, who controlled the flourishing trade with China and Japan. Involving himself in the thick of the 
political strife in the capital, he was assassinated in the end and “[h]is death and the subsequent 
disappearance of his maritime commercial empire very probably marked the passing of the high-
water mark of Korean mastery over the sea lying between China, Korea and Japan” (Reischauer 
1955, p. 294).  
China’s trade grew steadily from the ninth century onward (Wang 2003, p. 137). During the 
Song (宋, 960-1279) and Yuan (元, 1271-1368) dynasties, the Chinese made great advances in 
shipbuilding and nautical technology. They actively engaged in maritime trade in the East Asian 
seas, and even advanced to Indian ports (Abu-Lughod 1989, pp. 274-5). As a result, foreign trade   11
came to account for a large share of Chinese government revenues during the Southern Song, 
almost the only period before the nineteenth century that it did so (Fairbanks 1998, p. 92).  
Control over commerce in the Northeast Asian seas shifted from the hands of Korean to 
Chinese traders from the tenth century, and then to Japanese traders some centuries later. As in 
ninth century Korea, maritime advance in eleventh century Japan resulted from the weakening of 
the authority of the ritsuryo state and the rise of local rulers (Tanaka 1975). As the power of the 
ritsuryo state to control foreign trade had diminished, by the eleventh century, “[t]he appearance of 
unofficial ports within shoen partially immune from government taxes and law offered Chinese 
merchants a more attractive and profitable alternative” to the state administered trade (McCullough 
1999, p. 87). Japan’s overseas trade grew steadily from the twelfth to the early seventeenth century, 
by which time Japan’s proportion of trade in GDP was as high as in Western Europe and the 
country’s mercantile inclination as strong as Western Europe’s.6  
Ryukyu emerged as a trading country from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century. The 
kingdom of the Ryukyu benefited from the tribute trade with China by obtaining goods that were 
subsequently sold on to Japan and Southeast Asia, and from the transit trade between Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia. However, Ryuku’s trade was eroded in the second half of the sixteenth 
century by the Japanese who traded directly with Southeast Asia, by the Chinese who became active 
in maritime trade after the lifting of the country’s ban on maritime trade in 1567, and by Portuguese 
traders who entered the East Asian seas (Takara 1993). Ryukyu was conquered by the Shimazu of 
Satsuma in 1609, but continued its role as an entrepôt for trade between China and Japan.    
This convergence in trade development among the different regions of the Eurasian 
continent can be partly explained by the convergence of trade policies. An important reason for the 
growth in Korea’s, China’s, and Japan’s maritime trade was the dismantling of restrictive trade 
policies or the adoption of policies to actively purse gains from trade. Around the thirteenth century, 




4. The trade retreat in Northeast Asia and the divergence in early modern trade  
 
With regard to world trade, the notable trends in the late medieval and early modern period are 
the rise of Europe as the dominant sea power, the relative decline of the Middle East and India, and 
the sudden retreat in the maritime activities of the Northeast Asian countries. This reversal from 
                                                 
6 The Japanese actively advanced into Southeast Asia for trade (Iwao 1984).   12
convergence to divergence cannot be explained by geography, because the previous convergence in 
trade development demonstrates that the binding force of geography had in fact weakened. The 
reversal also cannot be explained by economic factors such as factor endowments, because there 
was no change in factor endowment around the period of this reversal. The argument that I 
therefore put forward here is that it is a divergence in trade policies between Western Europe and 
Northeast Asia that was the crucial factor underlying the divergence in trade developments between 
the two regions.  
There is considerable variation in pre-industrial trade policies, depending on the period and 
the region concerned. However, trade policies may be classified into three major types. The first 
type can be characterized as an open trade policy. This policy allowed relatively free and open trade 
and pursued to generate tax revenues for the state. Chaudhury (1985, pp. 12-14) presented this most 
widely adopted trade strategy of states as follows: “There were certainly well-established 
conventions in commercial contracts in all the trading cities of the Mediterranean and the Indian 
Ocean. The legal corpus protected merchants when the contracts were concluded between intra-
communal members, […] before the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in 1498 there had 
been no organized attempt by any political power to control the sea-lanes and the long distance 
trade of Asia.” 
But even among open trade policies, some variation can be observed. The large states in 
India, with their capitals inland and deriving most of their fiscal revenues from land, did not 
actively pursue gains from trade in the same way as the Chinese empire did. This passive attitude is 
one reason for the small share of trade in India’s product before the nineteenth century. By contrast, 
the small political units of South India and the Malabar showed significant financial interest in 
maritime trade (Chaudhuri 1985, p. 15; Maddison 2005, p.56). Similarly, the small states of 
Southeast Asia actively responded to the expanding trade opportunities provided firstly by the 
China’s maritime advance and more importantly by the arrival of European buyers since 1509, 
meeting the trade boom of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This is mainly because the 
financial and military advantages derived from trade were critical to these states’ existence and 
expansion (Reid 1993).  
The second type of trade policy, namely mercantilism, appeared in Europe. Mercantilism 
represents the most active type of trade policy before the Industrial Revolution, systematically using 
state power in the commercial competition with other countries to increase the profits from trade. 
Mercantilist trade policies included, for example, the granting of trade privileges to protect native 
merchants, attempts to control trade routes by using the power of the state, and the encouragement 
of exports for the accumulation of bullion - aspects that were absent from the other types of trade   13
policy. 7 Such state support, in turn, contributed to Europe’s discovery of the sea routes to Asia and 
America, and the advance into these regions provided the impetus for Europe’s notable increase in 
trade and guaranteed the continent’s invincible position in world trade.8  
The third type of trade policy was the passive and restrictive one adopted by the countries 
in the Northeast Asian region. The three Northeast Asian countries, which once had shown the 
potential to become maritime powers during the Middle Ages, suddenly abandoned their path to 
maritime power of their own accord. Ming China, Goryeo and Joseon Korea, and Tokugawa Japan 
all reverted to their former restrictive trade policies. In fact, they adopted trade policies that were 
more restrictive than at any time in the past. The reason is that these countries were willing to 
sacrifice gains from trade in order to achieve their diplomatic and political aims under the 
strengthened tribute system or the seclusion policy. Whereas the European mercantilist states 
restricted the trading activities of foreign traders to provide support for native traders, the Northeast 
Asian countries curtailed the trading activities of native traders. Of the three types of trade policy 
described here, that of the three Northeast Asian countries thus was the most unfavorable for 
foreign trade, and the distinct advantage of the second type of trade policy over the third one was an 
important reason for the divergence in trade development between Europe and Northeast Asia.   
Among the three Northeast Asian countries, Korea was the first not only to achieve 
substantial maritime advances but also to abandon its path to maritime power. The Goryeo 
government came to prohibit private maritime trade independent of emissary traffic.  Korean 
merchants did not go to Japan from the Goryeo dynasty onward, as the interest of the Korean 
dynasties in maritime trade diminished.  Since the latter part of the eleventh century, Japanese 
vessels came to Korea, paid tributes, and engaged in trade. Private trade with China grew gradually 
in the late Goryeo dynasty, but the Joseon government at first prohibited all private trade with 
China. Although the Joseon government eventually allowed private trade attendant on tribute 
missions and authorized border-market trade, it did not allow Koreans to go overseas for trade until 
1882.  
Similarly, China at the beginning of the Ming dynasty, after a two-hundred-year period of 
mercantile adventurism, reverted to its former restrictive trade policies, consolidating the tribute 
                                                 
7 Venice systematically used state power and, in the words of Curtin (1984, pp. 117-9) turned “an 
incipient maritime trade diaspora into a full-blown trading-post empire with military control over chosen 
centers.” Other Italian port cities followed this pattern of establishing a maritime trading-post empire. 
This Mediterranean style of trade and warfare was exported to the Indian Ocean by the Portuguese, thus 
violating the agreed conventions of that Ocean (Chaudhury 1985, pp. 63-4). 
8  The discovery of the new sea routes as well as differences in trade policies provided Europe with a 
strong advantage over the Middle East in terms of trade activity. However, the relative decline of the   14
system and implementing a maritime ban. By then, this maritime ban dealt a serious blow to trade 
growth, not only because seaborne trade became “the leading sector of commercial growth in the 
world economy” (Curtin 1984, p. 179), but also because “the Chinese had achieved almost all the 
preconditions for a flourishing trade both within and outside the empire” (Wang 2003, p. 138). 
Although China eventually removed the maritime ban in 1684, it did not change the underlying 
principles of the restrictive trade policies until the forced opening of its ports in 1842. 
As for Japan, as mentioned in Section II, foreign trade declined drastically after the 
imposition of severe restrictions on exchanges with Westerners in the 1630s and tight restrictions on 
the export of silver from the late seventeenth century. Commercial relations with the outside world 
were extremely limited. In 1636, the Tokugawa government ordered that henceforth Japanese could 
not go abroad. Two years later followed the prohibition of the construction of large ships that would 
be suitable for overseas trade. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Japan’s economy 
therefore was almost completely closed. 
Trade policies were an important reason why Northeast Asia fell behind in trade 
development before the ninth century and play a key role in explaining trade growth from the ninth 
century onward. Moreover, they were the decisive factor underlying the drastic retreat in trade in 
later centuries and explain why, by the early nineteenth century, Korea, Japan, and China traded 
less than countries in other regions. The following section explains how these policies were adopted.  
 
 
IV. A Theory of Pre-industrial Trade Policy9   
 
1. The effects of externalities on behavior 
 
Economic theory suggests that trade occurs when it provides net economic gains and 
rational actors act to maximize such gains.  If we want to explain trade in the pre-industrial era, and 
especially China’s, Korea’s, and Japan’s, we need to modify the theory.  The assumption of rational 
actors does not need to be modified, because people in general prefer an advantageous outcome to a 
less advantageous one. We assume that pre-industrial trade policies were the outcome of rational 
choices made by rulers.  
                                                                                                                                                     
Middle East began before the discovery of the new sea route to Asia. Another reason were institutional 
weaknesses in Muslim societies (Abulafia 1987). 
9 This section is a summary of Section II of Lee and Temin (2005).   15
However, we need to consider those non-economic effects that trade produces as well as the 
economic gains.  In the industrial era, the economic gains from trade have been enormous, owing to 
the development of markets and technology, while its non-economic effects have often been 
negligible when compared with the economic benefits. The situation in the pre-industrial era was 
quite different or even the opposite. The economic gains from trade may have been small, owing to 
high transaction costs and small trade volumes.  On the other hand, the non-economic effects of 
trade, namely, externalities, may have been substantial, since trade had significant effects on 
diplomacy, internal politics, and even culture.  As shown later, the pre-industrial governments in 
Northeast Asia considered other aspects as well as economic aspects when making decisions about 
trade.  
The rulers of pre-industrial states attached great importance to border security and culture. 
Wars and conquests broke out frequently in the pre-industrial era, and frontiers were far more fluid 
than in the industrial era. The most important object of diplomacy often was border security, and 
trade policy may have been subordinated to diplomacy.  In the pre-industrial era, many societies 
also were closed to alien cultures and ideologies, and people often drew a sharp line between 
civilized people and barbarians. Trade was an important way to spread alien cultures and ideologies, 
particularly when other forms of communication were limited. Power elites consequently may have 
administered trade in order to foster the acquisition of high culture or to protect their state from 
undesirable ideologies.   
In the pre-industrial era, when polities typically were not democratic, internal political 
concerns also mattered much. Every policy, including trade policy, ultimately aimed at 
consolidating the current rulers' political power. The distribution of the economic gains from trade 
might affect the distribution of power; nobles and local elites could increase their power by 
amassing trade gains, or they could connect to a foreign trading power and defy state authority.  
Ideologies that would threaten state authority also might enter the country.   
The consideration above suggests two factors that explain why pre-industrial governments 
had a propensity to administer trade, sometimes carrying out trade directly and sometimes imposing 
severe limitations on private trade. The first factor is trade externalities. In the presence of 
externalities, free trade potentially did not ensure the maximization of society’s welfare, and 
government intervention could help to achieve a maximization of total net benefit. The second 
factor is rulers’ incentive for trade. Rulers in non-democratic societies in general were inclined to 
maximize their own gains rather than the country’s gains. If trade affected the distribution of power, 
free trade would not ensure the maximization of rulers’ welfare. In the case of the restriction of   16
trade with the aim of preserving the rulers’ own political power, social welfare is not 
maximized. 
It is difficult to measure the total net benefit from trade covering all aspects ranging from 
diplomacy and defense to the acquisition of cultural goods and services, and internal politics. 
Moreover, Simon (1982) argued that human beings even in the modern world exhibit bounded 
rationality owing to the limitation of their knowledge and computational ability even in the purely 
economic domain. This limitation was far more severe in a choice problem that covered various 
domains and in the case of pre-modern people. There must have been some method of comparing 
different aspects and calculating total net benefit or some criteria and principles to guide decisions 
since decisions to prohibit, limit, or encourage trade were made.  
We observe two major procedures in history.   The first was to follow the principle of 
priority.  People determined the rank of importance among competing goals and pursued first an 
objective of high priority.  Then they pursued a goal of lower priority within the limits of not 
hurting the goal with higher priority.  This is a method often used by statesmen and diplomats.   
The highest priority of foreign policy in pre-industrial China, Korea, and Japan was border 
security, which made sense when war and conquest broke out frequently and frontiers were fluid.  If 
trade affected the security problem, or if the security problem could be managed through trade, it 
was rational to subordinate economic activity such as trade to diplomacy in order to deal with the 
security problem, because a security risk incurred a huge cost far exceeding any short-term trade 
gains. Only slightly less important was the need to promote domestic tranquility, that is, to prevent 
independent groups from threatening the state’s power. 
The second procedure was to devise institutions or policies to internalize externalities. 
Institutions produce stable patterns of behavior and help people to avoid inconsistent acts arising 
from difficult choice problems in various domains.  This mode of operation also saves the costs of 
calculation arising from difficult choice problems.  A prominent example of such an institution is 
the Chinese tribute system.  Trade policy under the tribute system helped China to achieve border 
security and suzerainty. The rationale of this policy will be elaborated in Section V.  
 
 
2. Formal restatement of the argument 
 
A simple game-theoretical model is presented to explain the pattern of pre-industrial trade 
and clarify the reasons why pre-industrial rulers often limited and sometimes even prohibited   17
private trade.10 The order of the game is that the government chooses a strategy and traders (or 
foreign countries) then choose either to obey or disobey.  Such a sequential game needs to be 
expressed in extensive form, as in Table 2.  The initial node is the government’s strategy.  The 
second node is the traders’ strategy, and the terminal node contains the payoffs.  The government 
chooses the more advantageous strategy, considering the response of traders or trading counterparts. 
 









Obey  A  B 
Disobey  a - α1  b + α2 - β1 
Prohibit  
private trade 
Obey 0  0 
Disobey  -α3  α4 - β2 
 
In the table, a represents the government’s gains from trade, while b stands for traders’ 
gains from trade.  If official trade exists, a and b are the increment in gains from allowing private 
trade. The ruler or government receives tariff revenues, whereas traders earn profits that are part of 
the economy’s gains from trade. The a represents the total gains, including externalities.  
Next, the αi represent the losses of the ruler or traders’ gains arising from disobedience. 
The αi include both economic and non-economic losses or gains. Disobedience means, from an 
economic perspective, that traders engage in illegal trade and, from a non-economic perspective, 
that they defy state authority. If we confine our attention to economic gains or losses, α1 is the loss 
of tariff revenues due to smuggling or other illegal activity.  If α1 includes the risk of losing 
political power, it may well be larger than a. The costs include both the damage to the country’s 
diplomatic relations and to its internal stability. 
A similar duality applies to α3.  If we confine our attention to economic gains or losses, α3 
measures the cost of trying to eliminate smuggling.  If we take a broader view, α3 may include the 
costs to the ruler of chronic disobedience by his subjects, such as acts of piracy.  
The βi represent the expected costs of punishment, that is, the probability of being detected 
multiplied by the disutility from the penalty for disobedience. The stronger the government, the 
more likely it is that traders who disobey the rules will be punished. 
                                                 
10 The political economy of international trade has become a growing field in both economics and 
political science.  See, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (2002), and Milner (1997).   18
This extensive form game can be solved by backward induction.  Traders obey if α2 < β1 
and α4 < β2.  They disobey if the inequalities go the other way. We denote the probability that 
traders disobey as p when private trade is allowed and as q when it is prohibited.  The expected 
payoff to the government when it allows trade is (1- p)a + p(a-α1) = a - pα1.  The expected payoff 
when the government prohibits trade is -qα3; even if private trade is prohibited, the government 
incurs the expected cost of -qα3.  If a - pα1 > -qα3, the government chooses the strategy of 
allowing trade.  If a - pα1+qα3 < 0, it chooses the strategy of prohibiting trade.  If official trade 
exists and a - pα1 + qα3 < 0, only official trade is allowed.  Moreover, it is likely that the bigger the 
proportion of a - pα1 + qα3 in GDP or financial revenues, the stronger is the incentive for a policy 
to actively pursue gains from trade.  
 
 
3. Important factors determining pre-industrial trade policy 
 
Active trade policies are promoted by economic growth and market development. If tariff 
revenues (a) increase with economic growth, then the ruler will be more inclined to allow trade. 
Moreover, if merchants’ incentive for trade is strengthened by economic growth and market 
development, then α3 becomes bigger. Again, rulers have a stronger reason to allow private trade.  
Then how can we explain the appearance of policies that prohibit or limit trade? Our simple 
model can generate an important conclusion: such policies cannot be explained by economic factors 
alone.  If it is assumed initially that α1 includes only economic gains and losses, then -α1 
represents the decrease in fiscal revenue arising from a decrease in the legal trade volume owing to 
smuggling.  Whatever the amount of smuggling, the legitimate trade cannot be below zero. That is, 
a - α1>0.  Therefore, a - pα1 + qα3 is greater than zero.  The ruler always allows trade. We 
therefore arrive at the proposition that if trade was prohibited, there must have been non-economic 
factors that affected trade policy.  In other words, the economic loss from smuggling alone cannot 
be a rationale for trade prohibition.   
Now expand the interpretation of the model to include non-economic gains and losses.  
Then we cannot rule out the possibility that a - pα1 + qα3 < 0. Traders may accumulate resources 
that could be used to challenge the ruler’s authority.  Ideas brought in by traders might diminish 
support for the ruler.  The ruler might have much more than a at stake in choosing a trade strategy.  
If these potential losses, represented by -α1, are very large, a - pα1 + qα3 may be below zero.  If 
the government is weak so that traders do not fear punishment and p is high, then this conclusion   19
may be even stronger. If the government is very weak and inefficient, it may anticipate that official 
trade could decrease dramatically if private trade were allowed.  
The history of trade policies in pre-industrial Northeast Asia can be summed up as a battle 
between the forces to promote trade, driven by the growth of markets and the economy, and the 
forces to restrict trade, driven by non-economic factors. Because, as will be explained in the 
following section, the latter forces were stronger in pre-industrial Northeast Asia than in pre-
industrial Europe, trade policies were more restrictive and passive.  
 
 
V. Explanations for Trade Policies in Pre-industrial Northeast Asia11 
 
1. The restrictive trade policies of ancient states in Northeast Asia  
 
Why did the Chinese empires and the Korean territorial states before the ninth century, and 
the Japanese ritsuryo state before the eleventh century have in common trade policies that were 
restrictive of private trade? I would argue that the restrictive trade policies of ancient states in 
Northeast Asia were ultimately shaped by the unique geopolitics of this region. 
Ancient Chinese civilization was founded in North China in the region of the great bend of 
the Yellow river. The North China Plain, a loess area (see Figure 1), was, like the homes of any 
other ancient civilization, well suited to agriculture in primitive times.  The North China Plain 
covers an area of about 387,000 km
2, half of which consists of arable land. Its size far surpassed that 
of the homes of other ancient civilizations. The main economic resources of almost all the Chinese 
states before the Song (宋, 960-1279) had been based on this plain. Because there are no geographic 
barriers in this enormous region, the militarily competing states had no choice other than to unite in 
the end. This vast open plain provided a geographic and economic base for the existence and long 
duration of the Chinese empire before the Song dynasty. Southern and western regions of China 
subsequently also became rice-baskets. The existence of this large Chinese empire was of utmost 
importance in shaping the trade policies of the Northeast Asian countries. 
 
Figure 1: Geographical Features of China: The North China Plain (華北平原), a Loess (黃土) 
Area  
                                                 
11 The explanation of Chinese and Korean trade is mostly from Lee and Temin (2004; 2005). However, 
I made some changes in this paper, the most notable of which is the inclusion of the influence of the 
North China Plain.   20
Source: Fairbank and Goldman (1998, p. 10). 
 
On the one hand, the big inland empire in China made few economic gains from trade (i.e., 
in terms of our model, a in an economic sense was small). First, China was a very big country, its 
internal prices were not affected much by trade, and its economic gains from trade would have been 
small. Because of the availability of huge and fertile fields, the pre-industrial Chinese empire had 
little need to search for resources other than land for fiscal purposes. Second, the inland location of 
the political center weakened the incentive for maritime trade. Third, China was an internally self-
sufficient country, producing almost all the goods it needed.  The Chinese often said that they had 
little need for trade, because China’s land was vast and it had ample domestically-produced goods 
(地大物博). Fourth, China possessed advanced technology and needed few “high-tech” goods. Fifth, 
China had no neighbors of comparable might. 
On the other hand, China’s large empire enjoyed great non-economic gains from trade, in 
other words, the externalities of trade.  China faced formidable military challenges from the 
nomadic tribes of Inner Asia, such as the Xiongnu (匈奴) and the Mongols, that urgently wanted 
Chinese goods. The harsh natural environment in which they lived meant that the nomads suffered 
shortages of materials necessary for their survival. As a consequence, they had to rely on trade, 
plunder, and the exploitation of neighboring countries to obtain the needed materials. Thus, for 
China, trade manipulation through the tribute system contributed both to the defense of the 
country’s borders and the establishment of its suzerainty, the main foreign policy objectives of the 
Chinese state. Even if China incurred economic losses in the tribute trade, its diplomatic and 
military gains from trade were great enough to compensate for any economic loss. Therefore, China 
adopted a tribute system under which trade was subordinated to diplomacy. Thus, the passive and 
restrictive trade policies were closely related to the adoption of the tribute system.  
The state rulers had another incentive to adopt the tribute system.  There had been a 
diplomatic principle from ancient times in Northeast Asia that subjects did not have the right of 
diplomacy (人臣無外交), which provided an ideological underpinning for the tribute system. 
Springing from this principle was a policy to ensure that the state captured or monopolized the gains 
from trade (Kim 1934; Arano 1988). Such a policy helped to block the rise of local maritime 
powers that could challenge the authority of the state. 
The idea that China was the center of civilization, and the Confucian teaching that 
governance by virtue with an economically generous attitude was the royal road to becoming king, 
played some role in devising and justifying the tribute system.  However, culture played an   21
ancillary role; building up the tribute system was rational without considering Confucianism.12 
Historically, the need for countermeasures against the Xiongnu threat was the decisive factor in 
establishing the tribute system (Yü 1967). 
Under the tribute system, China’s rulers attached pivotal importance to gift exchange which 
symbolized its suzerainty and was also an economic exchange of real value. What is more, 
reciprocal exchanges often were conducted through the evaluation of exchanged items, showing 
that this gift exchange was not completely independent of market forces (Lee 2004; Gao & Feng 
2003, p. 28).  While tribute trade was inefficient in pursuing economic gains, its raison d’être was 
its efficiency in internalizing externalities. Tribute trade included voluntary transfers from China or 
compulsory transfers to China to internalize externalities, the most important of which were 
diplomatic and military.  The stronger in military power, or the more strategic and friendly in 
diplomatic relations a foreign country, the more favorable was the gift exchange rate adopted by the 
Chinese government (Lee 2004).  
Under the tribute system, official trade with gift exchange as the major item was substantial, 
while private trade, especially maritime trade, was often restricted by the state. What factors made 
pre-industrial states promote official trade?  First, the profit margin rate of official trade exceeded 
the tax rate of private trade.  Second, official trade may have had non-economic gains, such as 
diplomatic gains as seen in tribute trade, because it was effective in internalizing externalities.  
Third, official trade that allows rulers to stay in control of trade does not incur the negative 
externality represented by α1. However, official trade was an inefficient way to expand trade. 
Therefore, a good way to increase rulers’ gains from trade, a in terms of our model, is to allow both 
official trade and private trade. 
China allowed tribute embassies to carry out trade at the capital and the border to permit 
embassies to cover their expenses or procure goods desired by the state, but often suppressed 
private trade. Trade attendant on tribute traffic was never prohibited, but it had predetermined 
trading dates, places and participants, and did not allow the trade of certain items.  
Then why did pre-industrial states often choose to suppress private trade, while promoting 
official trade? It appears that a - pα1 + qα3 > 0 when only official trade is allowed, but a - pα1 + 
qα3 < 0 when private trade is also allowed, for the following reasons. Unlimited private trade 
would encroach on official trade. If the government had been weak so that traders did not fear 
punishment and p was high, the government may have anticipated that official trade could have 
decreased dramatically if private trade had been allowed. If official trade also provided non-
                                                 
12 Wang (2003) argues that Confucian attitudes had not inhibited overseas trade until the fourteenth 
century but became a major factor during the Ming and Qing dynasties.    22
economic gains, the potential losses, represented by -α1, became large. Moreover, the tribute 
system meant larger non-economic gains from official trade. China preferred vertical tribute trade to 
horizontal private trade in order to display its suzerainty. If there were no limitations on private 
trade, especially that independent of tribute traffic, it would be difficult for China to manipulate 
foreign rulers through tribute trade. In addition, the pre-industrial rulers of Korea and China often 
thought that the marginal increase in gains from trade when also allowing private trade were not 
that great.  
Pre-industrial China was more restrictive of private trade independent of tribute traffic than 
that attendant on tribute traffic because the former was more difficult to monitor and posed a threat 
to the official trade, including tribute trade.  In terms of our model, α1 was large.   
Private maritime trade was more severely limited than private land trade; in fact, it was the 
main target of prohibition. Private maritime trade by Chinese was restricted before the late Tang 
dynasty, and was banned altogether during 1368 – 1567 and 1655-1684. This was because private 
maritime trade was apt to arouse negative externalities, which would more than offset the economic 
gains from private maritime trade. Maritime traders could amass great fortunes and gain power that 
would threaten state authority. Moreover, it was impossible to prevent maritime traders from 
interacting with people of foreign, hostile countries and leaking secret information. The government 
sometimes thought that a maritime ban would be a way to blockade the activities of pirates. In terms 
of our model, this means that a from independent maritime trade was large, but α1 was also very 
large.  
Another question is why Korea and Japan followed the Chinese pattern of pursuing 
restrictive trade policies. This cannot be explained satisfactorily without considering the existence 
of the large and powerful Chinese empire. Both Japan and Korea had geographies much more 
advantageous to trade than China: Korea is a peninsular country, while Japan is an archipelago, and 
both countries are not large. However, they had a geographical disadvantage in trade development 
in that they faced a China that was united and adopted a restrictive trade policy. Korea for the most 
part of its pre-industrial period had no other choice but to accommodate to the Chinese tribute 
system, mainly because it shared a common border with a China that was strong militarily and 
possessed an advanced culture, economy and technology. Korea enjoyed peaceful diplomatic 
relations with China for very a long time span as compensation for accepting an inferior position 
under the Chinese tribute system. Moreover, under the tribute system, the Korean states were able 
to benefit economically from the generous gift trade with China and could easily absorb high 
culture and technology from China. The adoption of the tribute system made smaller the gains from 
private trade, a in terms of our model, because of the substantial official trade. And unlimited   23
private trade would encroach on official trade.  If official trade provided non-economic gains, the 
potential losses, represented by -α1, would become large. Thus, Korea’s adoption of the tribute 
system also led to restrictive trade policies.  
In contrast with Korea, Japan’s geographic isolation helped it to free itself from the Chinese 
world order. But then why did the ritsuryo state choose to suppress private trade? First, Japanese 
rulers sometimes accommodated to China’s tribute system, because the introduction of Chinese 
civilization was vital to the development of the state. Second, like Chinese and Korean rulers, they 
wanted to control the source of trade gains. Third, gains from private trade were small, because not 




2. The active pursuit of trade gains in medieval Northeast Asia 
 
The considerations above raise the question why restrictive trade policies were abandoned 
and/or policies to actively pursue trade adopted in the medieval period. Moreover, why is it that at 
this time, all the Northeast Asian countries showed a potential to become maritime powers? At least 
three reasons can be made out. First, the growth of trade between East and West, aided by the 
trading vessels from the Muslim world, stimulated maritime trade in Northeast Asia. Second, 
economic growth, especially the development of Southern China, supported the growth of maritime 
trade. But this would not have sufficed without the third and decisive factor, namely, changes in the 
political situation in Northeast Asia, which is expounded below.  
When China was divided or too weak to maintain suzerainty, there appeared Chinese rulers 
who were active in pursuing trade gains, like the European mercantilists. During the long periods of 
disunity and competition, called the Spring and Autumn Period (722-481 B.C.) and the Warring 
States Period (403-221 B.C.), Qi (齊), a state located on the eastern edge of the North China Plain, 
adopted an active economic policy to encourage trade and monopolize salt and iron production. A 
Chinese record says that furs of Old Joseon (古朝鮮) were already famous goods in Qi (Chen 1997, 
p .3). Thanks to its active economic policies, Qi increased its area sixfold in the seventh and eighth 
centuries B.C.  
During the Six Dynasties period (222-589), another long period of disunity, the southern six 
dynasties promoted ship building and sought maritime advances to strengthen their political and   24
military position (Chen 1997, p. 8).13 Wu (220-280), the southern kingdom during the Three 
Kingdoms period, actively sought out the Southeast Asian kingdoms and ports for closer 
relationships.  
Although the Tang (唐, 618-907) government allowed maritime interchange to grow, it also 
restricted private trade. During a short period of disunity after the fall of the Tang dynasty, as Wang 
(2000, p. 14) observes, the rulers and officials in the four coastal states “knew the value of overseas 
trade and depended on the profits of that trade to help finance their defense against the continental 
threat of reunification that would put to an end their independence.”  
The Song success in reunifying the empire in the late tenth century slowed down the 
development of overseas trade by the previous southern kingdoms.  When Keifeng, the capital of 
the Northern Song, fell to the Jurchen (金) in 1127, the Song were forced to move south to 
Hangzhou. As Wang (2000, p. 15) remarks, “[i]t is that move that led to the beginning of a new era 
for the expansion of coastal trade.” And Smith (1991, p. 8) has observed in this context that “the 
Song state’s unusually active involvement in domestic and international commerce was prompted 
by an endless search for new methods of generating revenues to finance these expensive 
technological and logistical solutions to military vulnerability.” The central means to increase 
national wealth was the expansion of trade (Shiba 1983, p. 110). Thus, it was the military inferiority 
of the Song that gave rise to an active economic policy that resembled European mercantilism.  
How can this change in Chinese trade policy be explained in the model proposed here?  
First, the economic gains of a became large, because as a result of the division, countries were small 
and some of them were well placed to expand their maritime trade.  Second, the externalities of a 
also became large, because the rulers urgently needed funds to compete militarily, which trade 
could provide. Third, the negative externalities of private trade of α1 became small, because the 
incentive to defend suzerainty became weak. Fourth, there appeared a new form of α3 in times of 
disunity.  If a ruler prohibited private trade, his rival could benefit if traders changed their trading 
place.  
Although the Yuan (元, 1279-1368) were strong enough to maintain suzerainty, they were 
as active in trade as the Song. This is because the Yuan Mongols were not fully sinicized and, as a 
consequence of their nomadic origin, attached greater importance to the economic gains from trade 
than the Chinese. Moreover, it probably also helped that the Song dynasty that preceded them had 
                                                 
13 Abulafia (1987, pp. 444-5) observes: “The fifth and sixth centuries saw independent developments in 
the Far East which gave slow birth to the oversea routes. The division of China between northern and 
southern dynasties made access by foreign merchants to southern China less easy, at least by sea.   25
adopted an active trade policy. On the other hand, the position of the Qing (凊, 1636-1912) was 
different, because they were fully sinicized and inherited a restrictive trade policy from the Ming. 
Private maritime trade flourished in Northeast Asia from the mid-eighth century as state 
powers in China and Korea weakened (Kim 1934). The weakening of state restrictions in medieval 
Japan also led to a diversification in the exchange with foreign countries and a growth in trade. This 
suggests that if states or rulers had not intervened, private maritime trade would have prospered in 
Northeast Asia.  When state power weakened, the expected costs of punishment for private 
maritime trade, ß2, decreased, so q increased.  This is another reason why the sign of a - pα1 + qα3 
changed: the state gave up prohibiting private maritime trade. The growth of private trade in China 
also contributed to the change in trade policy in Korea and Japan.    
In Europe where after the fall of the Roman Empire there was no hegemonic country like 
China, feudal societies appeared, competition between states prevailed, and self-governing city-
states emerged in the context of decentralized states.  Feudal lords had strong incentives to actively 
participate in trade in order to survive and expand in the competition between them, as did 
European states when they grew, because of the strong competition in their environment.  In such a 
situation, rational rulers would not adopt, or continue for long, institutions or policies under which 
economic interests were sacrificed for the sake of non-economic goals, because this strategy led to 
the weakening of state power.  Rulers were more concerned with trade gains that would generate 
funds available for winning competition when rivalry became violent.  By comparison, Chinese 
rulers did not have strong incentives to promote trade because of the weakness of internal and 
external competition.  But when China was divided or too weak to maintain suzerainty, there 
appeared Chinese rulers who behaved like European mercantilists. And China’s trade policies 
exerted a strong influence upon those of Korea and Japan.   
 
 
3. The return to restrictive policies in Goryeo and Joseon Korea, Ming China, and Tokugawa Japan 
 
Why did the three Northeast Asian countries suddenly abandon any maritime ambitions? As 
mentioned in Section III, during the Middle Ages, economic factors such as the trade growth 
between East and West for once appear to have overcome the binding force of Northeast Asian 
geopolitics unfavorable to trade. However, these economic factors subsequently were once again 
                                                                                                                                                     
[…P]erhaps the most significant achievement of the Malay merchants was to introduce the Chinese to a 
range of commodities which had not greatly attracted attention before the fifth century.”   26
eclipsed when the new rulers of Ming China, Joseon Korea, and Tokugawa Japan consolidated the 
state systems at the beginning of their reigns.  
In China, the Ming adopted the most restrictive trade policy of all dynasties to have ruled 
the country. The reasons for such a restrictive trade policy can be found in the Ancestral Injunctions 
of the first Ming emperor (洪武帝 皇明祖訓). First, the costs of expeditions were high, because 
foreign countries were “separated by mountains and seas and far away in a corner.” Second, the 
costs of occupation were also high, because “their people will not usefully serve us.”  And third, the 
economic benefits of colonization were not great, because “their lands will not produce enough for 
us to maintain them.”  Because China’s tax revenues from land were large, Chinese rulers did not 
have a strong incentive to seek tax revenues from conquered lands or trade. Moreover, since China 
produced diverse goods and, unlike most European countries, had a big internal market, it does not 
seem out of the ordinary for its rulers not to actively search for colonies as export markets and 
resource bases. It was therefore a rational choice for China not to become a colonial power. 
Though Ming China decided to cling to the tribute system and not become a colonial power, 
it still could have actively pursued economic gains from trade like the Song and Yuan dynasties did.  
Why did it not do that?  The Yuan policy of encouraging maritime trade did not appeal to the 
founder of the Ming dynasty. In his view, uncontrolled private trade made the tribute system 
ineffective, giving rise to unrest along the coastal frontiers (Wang 1998, p. 303). Moreover, the 
Yuan dynasty had been short-lived and the Song dynasty similarly was not regarded by the Ming 
rulers and elites as a model to follow because the Song had been very weak militarily and were 
destroyed by the northern nomads, even though they actively engaged in trade and had built up the 
navy.  If the Song had been strong militarily or the Yuan had achieved political stability like the 
Qing eventually did, early modern world history might have turned out very different. 
Moreover, as the Ancestral Injunctions said, the most serious threat was the nomads of 
Inner Asia.  The capital was moved to Peking in order to cope with the Mongol military threat and 
effectively control the main army on the northern front.  The relocation of the capital in 1421 
signified the conversion of a maritime power to an inland empire. The above considerations show 
that in the context of East Asian geopolitics, the conversion was not an irrational choice. 
Was the maritime ban also a rational choice?  Private maritime trade by Chinese was 
entirely prohibited, and maritime trade only in connection with tribute embassies was allowed, the 
size and frequency of which were regulated. The main reason why Ming China implemented the 
maritime ban was to blockade the rise of local maritime powers that could defy the authority of the 
state, and defend itself from Japanese and Chinese pirates. Moreover, the Manchu Qing 
implemented the ban to destroy the strong naval power under Zheng Chenggong who fought against   27
the rising Qing for the dying Ming (Li 1990, pp. 80-81; Wang 2000, pp. 21, 31-32). Chinese rulers 
were very afraid of a combination of internal and external threats (內憂外患), or a joint menace 
from Inner Asian nomads and local maritime powers. They wanted to eliminate the maritime threat 
by a maritime ban and then focus on the threat from Inner Asia.  In terms of our model, Chinese 
rulers judged α1 from private maritime trade to be very high.  And they thought that a was small, so 
their calculation was a - pα1 + qα3 < 0.  
There was another effective way in which the Ming government could have coped with a 
maritime threat: it could have strengthened its naval power while allowing maritime trade. This 
approach would have been the fundamental solution to defend the coast and also obtain economic 
gains from maritime trade. If this approach indeed would have been better, the maritime ban must 
have been a decision resulting from bounded rationality because the Ming did not embrace this 
position.  
The fully-sinicized Manchu Qing adopted the typical tribute system as well as a passive 
stance toward trade. Before occupying China, the Qing imposed exploitative tributary relations on 
Korea based on their military strength. Once they had become the rulers of China, however, they 
made these relations reciprocal (Lee 2004). The Qing’s trade policy was less restrictive than the 
Ming’s, and maritime trade flourished after the Qing lifted the maritime ban (Matsuura 2003).  But 
trade under the Qing experienced considerable swings, increasing and contracting three times owing 
to the restrictive nature of trade policy (Chen 1991, p. 229). Mancall (1968, p. 89) has attributed the 
change in the Qing’s attitude to “the influence of the rigid Sino-Confucian tradition.”  However, it 
should be understood as a rational choice.  When the nomadic tribes lived in the steppe, they 
pursued trade in order to survive; and when they became rulers of China, they found that the 
traditional Chinese trade policies were useful to stabilize power and maintain suzerainty.   
When non-Chinese became the rulers of China, there arose a new externality of trade.  The 
reason why Emperor Kangxi prohibited Chinese trade in the South China Sea in 1716 was that he 
was afraid to face an alliance of Chinese traders and Chinese residents in Southeast Asia that stood 
against the Qing dynasty (Chen 1993, pp. 71-2). In our model, α1 became greater.  The Yuan 
dynasty did not have this problem, because overseas trade was largely in the hands of Muslims 
whom the Mongols trusted more than the Chinese.   
Turning now to Korea, why did the Goryeo dynasty come to prohibit private maritime trade 
independent of emissary traffic? The founder of the Goryeo dynasty and his successors, whose 
ancestors engaged in maritime trade, must have known of the large gains from maritime trade, 
because ninth century Korea witnessed prospering maritime trade. They must have concluded that a 
was large but that nevertheless a - pα1 + qα3 < 0 for independent maritime trade.  What made α1   28
so big?  The most important factor seems to be the lesson that the rise of local maritime power 
threatened the state power of the Unified Silla dynasty. It can be inferred from the cessation of 
independent maritime trade that the rulers of the Goryeo dynasty attached greater importance to the 
rulers’ incentive to monopolize diplomacy and trade than to the economic gains from unrestricted 
trade. 
The Joseon dynasty at first prohibited all private trade with China.  Such a strong policy 
against private trade can be largely explained by the attitudes of Ming China and the rise of 
Confucianism.  The Ming consolidated the tribute system, implemented a maritime ban, and were 
criticical of the private trade of Korean embassies.  The power elites who founded the Joseon 
dynasty argued that private trade weakened state discipline, basing their arguments on 
Confucianism, which became the ruling ideology of the new dynasty (Sukawa 1997). Confucians 
generally underestimated the economic role of commerce, a, and overemphasized the adverse effect 
of private economic motives on society and politics, α1. Before the Goryeo dynasty, Confucianism 
had little to do with the adoption and maintenance of the tribute system, but it played an important 
role in its consolidation during the Joseon dynasty.  
In the pre-industrial era of Northeast Asia, the most dramatic reversal in trade policy 
occured in seventeenth century Japan. Actually, Ieyasu, like his predecessors, was eager for 
commerce with the outside world. He had the idea of making Japan into a world maritime power 
that traded not only with Asia and Europe but also with America. Interestingly, all the rulers of 
Korea, Japan, and China who initiated the reversion to restrictive trade policies were keen political 
and economic calculators and were well aware of the gains from trade. Probably more than any 
other of these rulers, Ieyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa bakufu, was clearly aware of the gains 
from trade, and for him, a in our model seems to have been as large as for the European 
mercantilists.  
Nevertheless, the Tokugawa bakufu suddenly imposed restriction on trade as severe as the 
early Ming government and the Joseon government. This seclusion policy initiated by Ieyasu 
reveals that α1 was great enough to make a - pα1 + qα3 < 0. Ieyasu found that trade development 
benefited his military rivals, the strong daimyo in western Japan, such as Shimazu of Satsuma, more 
than himself (Uehara 2006).  Moreover, Ieyasu and his followers became convinced that if the 
belligerent European countries, the daimyo the trade with, and Christian Japanese were to form an 
alliance, they would have posed a formidable menace to the bakufu’s authority. Ieyasu and his 
followers thus seem to have attached greater importance to trade than Chinese rulers, but seem to 
have been more afraid of the combination of external and internal threats than Chinese rulers, 
because they could not established as centralized a state as China.   29
But in medieval and early modern Europe there were also states that were not completely 
centralized because of the presence of feudal lords. Why did these states not adopt policies similar 
to those of the Northeast Asian countries? The answer must lie in the geopolitical differences. If 
China and Korea had been actively engaged in trade with Japan, and they had been competing 
militarily with Japan, then Ieyasu probably would have given up the policy of seclusion, because he 
must have known that qα3 is too large for a - pα1 + qα3 to become less than 0. 
 
 
4. The persistence of restrictive trade policies in the context of developments in world trade around 
the eighteenth century 
 
It is worth noting that the growth of markets and hence the incentives for trade widened the 
range of private trade, resulting in “the eclipse of the tribute system by trade” in the Southern Song 
period (Shiba 1983, p. 110), the late Ming period, and the late Qing period (Fairbank 1953; 
Mazumdar 1998, chap. 2). On the one hand, the huge size of China meant that the gains from trade 
were small; on the other hand, this characteristic promoted the growth of markets and subsequently 
strengthened the incentives for trade. And trade with Europe grew from the sixteenth century. “The 
eclipse of the tribute system by trade” also happened, to a lesser degree, in seventeenth century 
Korea as a result of growing trade with Japan.  
Let us explain this “eclipse of the tribute system by trade” in terms of our model.  The 
growth of markets and the incentives for trade increased the cost of eliminating smuggling, α3. 
After experiencing widespread pirate activity, the Chinese government realized that the maritime 
ban increased α3.  As the bureaucrats became less strict, β2 decreased to become smaller than α4, 
so q increased. The bureaucrats also became officially or privately interested in absorbing part of 
the gains from trade, because a grew with the expansion of trade. Therefore, the sign of a - pα1 + 
qα3 changed. As a result, Ming and Qing China in the end lifted maritime bans and Joseon Korea 
officially allowed periodic border trade with China in the seventeenth century. These changes in 
trade policies provided an environment supportive of the increase in trade. 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Atlantic trade increased tremendously. 
However, China, Japan, and Korea did not consider changing the underlying principles of their 
trade policies until the forced opening of their ports around the mid-eighteenth century. Moreover, 
China showed significant resistance to the relaxation of restrictions on trade. A more restrictive 
trade system was established in 1757, under which only one port, Guangzhou (廣州), was open to   30
European traders and only privileged Chinese merchants, Cohong, were allowed to trade with 
Europeans.  
Let us explain why China devised this “Guangzhou system.”  The reasons were well 
expressed in a widely quoted passage of an edict by Emperor Qianlong to a British envoy in 1793.  
This shows, first, that the notion persisted that the economic gains from trade, a in terms of our 
model, were small. The edict stated: “This heavenly dynasty is so abundant with produce in every 
area that we usually do not rely on foreign goods for supply.”  Second, the Chinese thought that free 
trade would make the tribute system meaningless and undermine their suzerainty. In other words, 
China could not control the externalities, α1, under free trade. Therefore, a - pα1 + qα3 < 0 under 
free trade.   
China preferred the “Guangzhou system” not only to free trade but also to trade prohibition. 
China adopted the traditional strategy of letting barbarians cherish China from far away, so the edict 
said that “considering that tea, porcelain, and silk produced by this heavenly dynasty are so needed 
by every Western country including Britain, with my favor I grant you the right to establish trading 
houses in Macao so that your people not only get goods for everyday life but also share our profit.”  
This strategy revealed China’s concern about the complaints of Europeans when it prohibited trade.  
The cost of the Guangzhou system increased as trade with Europe and the European desire 
for more trade grew.  First, the economic gains would have increased considerably under free trade. 
The ratio of custom revenues to central government revenues was estimated to have been about 
10% in the early nineteenth century.  Custom revenues increased tenfold during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century (Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig 1978, p. 568). Chinese rulers and elites must 
not have imagined such a big increase. Second, smuggling increased along with the incentive for 
trade under the “Guangzhou system.” What was intolerable for China was the large-scale smuggling 
of opium. China’s misgivings over opium smuggling and British complaints about the “Guangzhou 
system” eventually escalated into the Opium War in 1840-41, resulting in China’s defeat at the 
hands of the British.  In other words, the attempt to stabilize the dynasty by clinging to restrictive 
trade policies in the end resulted in destabilizing it.  
Why did China fail to accurately assess the costs under the Guangzhou system? The main 
reason is that China failed to understand the meaning and impact of European advances until its 
defeat in the Opium War and the war with Britain and France in 1860. In fact, it was difficult for 
China to understand the European challenge, because this was a challenge of a new type. European 
states were maritime powers that had the potential to defeat China.  There had been no such powers 
before. Even in deliberations on defense strategy in 1874-5, frontier defense strategy prevailed over 
a maritime defense strategy, which was “influenced by the traditional lack of enthusiasm for   31
maritime affairs on the one hand, and by China’s deep historical interest in [Inner Asia] on the 
other” (Hsü 1965, p. 225).  In addition, European states were being transformed into modern 
industrial powers, which China had difficulty in understanding.  
So far, we have explained China’s trade polices – even the maritime ban by the first 
emperor of the Ming dynasty – as a rational calculation from the viewpoint of political economy 
without much recourse to culture. However, it seems that China’s response to the European 
challenge during the late Qing era cannot be explained without recourse to culture, such as the 
notion that China always had been the center of civilization, and the role of Confucianism in 
subordinating private economic motives to moral principles.14   
It is not difficult to understand why the Chinese should have held Sino-centric notions 
(中華觀念), given that China always had been the center of civilization in East Asia before the 
nineteenth century.  Because China was a far bigger and wealthier country than its surrounding 
neighbors, it could adopt a Confucian doctrine that belittled the pursuit of economic gains from 
trade.  The Chinese continental mind-set had become entrenched because China derived most of its 
income from the land, and the main threat it faced came from Inner Asia rather than from across the 
seas. Based on these considerations, I would argue that Chinese culture was molded largely by 
rational choices.   
But Chinese culture molded by rational choices could limit rationality in political and 
economic calculations owing to human bounded rationality and path-dependency. Because 
Confucianism had been the dominant ideology since the Han dynasty (漢, 206B.C.-220A.D.), 
cultural inertia was very strong.  Though the growth of markets and hence the increasing incentives 
for trade widened the range of private trade, resulting in “the eclipse of the tribute system by trade” 
in the late Qing period, culture played an important role in buttressing a policy that subordinated 
trade to diplomacy until the military power of an industrialized nation forced China to allow free 
trade.   
Turning to Korea and Japan, these two countries remained more restrictive in their 
exchange with the Western world than China. Even after China eventually removed its maritime 
ban in 1684, these two countries continued to cling to their policies. When Western ships came to 
Korean shores for trade in the nineteenth century, the Korean government refused all requests for 
trade. The rulers of the Joseon dynasty did not expect any gains from independent maritime trade. 
The Korean elites also thought that the exchange of Korean silver and gold for Western clothes was 
                                                 
14 Fairbank (1968) has developed a model of the tribute system that stresses cultural factors to explain 
foreign policy, including trade policy, in the late Qing period; however, because of its overemphasis 
on culture, the model is of limited use in explaining the tribute system before that period.    32
unfavorable to Korea. As a result, in terms of the model, they judged a to be small. The main reason 
why Korea prohibited trade with Westerners in the nineteenth century was the threat of a 
debasement of Confucian culture through the intrusion of Christianity. Because the Joseon court 
judged a to be very small and α1 to be very large, it turned out that a - pα1 + qα3 < 0. 
 
 
5. The role of culture in explaining restrictive trade policies 
 
Lastly, let me explain the role of culture which influential scholars have regarded as the 
most important factor for the restrictive trade policies in pre-industrial China and Korea. Culture 
influenced pre-industrial trade policies in two ways. First, it was a component of the total net 
benefit that the trade policies were designed to maximize. For example, in the late Joseon period, 
the government refused demands for trade by Westerners because the negative effects on its 
Confucian culture were deemed to surpass the economic gains from trade. Thus, the government 
was willing to pay the price of fighting with Western trading ships in order to protect Confucian 
culture. Second, culture influenced the political and economic calculation. For example, in late 
Joseon Korea, orthodox Confucians judged the economic gains from trade with Westerners to be 
small and the cultural losses to be large, while a few practical scholars argued that trade with 
Westerners would not only bring forth substantial economic gains but would also be beneficial in 
the cultural sphere (Lee 2003).  
Why did culture matter? Because human beings are boundedly rational and their positive 
views about how the world works are apt to be affected by their normative value judgments. Culture 
has been the product both of long-standing ways of thinking and of specific decisions made to solve 
specific historical problems (Temin 1997). Recourse to culture utilizes the transmitted and tested 
values from generation to generation, and saves the cost of internal conflicts. Aoki (2001, p. 13) 
therefore argues that “[i]n a world of incomplete and asymmetric information,” an institution that 
“coordinates agents’ beliefs only in summary and shared ways […] enables the bounded-rational 
agents to economize on the information processing needed for decision-making.” 
However, I do not agree with explanations that assign culture the central role in accounting 
for restrictive trade policies and argue that, in general, culture was not a major but a minor 
determinant of trade policies. An anti-commercial culture was common in many pre-industrial 
societies, and despite of this culture, not a few countries – such as ancient Greece and early modern   33
Portugal developed – maritime trade.15 Culture played only a marginal role in the devising of the 
tribute system in Han China, in accepting it in Korea before the Joseon dynasty, and in the policy of 
“national seclusion” in Japan during the 1630s.16  
Confucian culture that belittled commercial activities and was antipathetic to the Western 
religion played a significant role in determining the passive and restrictive trade policies in Ming 
and Qing China and in Joseon Korea. But even when Confucian culture exerted a strong influence, 
some rulers and elites were not ignorant of the gains from trade and were keen economic and 
political calculators. For example, a Korean politician in the fifteenth century argued that giving 
generous gifts to the Ryukyu ambassador did not make sense because the Ryukyus did not have the 
potential to invade Korea, whereas giving generous gifts to the Japanese made sense because they 
had this potential.17 It seems to have been only during the late Joseon dynasty when culture played a 
central role in blockading the exchange with Western countries that cultural consideration 
overwhelmed political and economic calculations in Northeast Asian history.   
It is owing to human bounded rationality and path-dependency that culture molded by 
rational choices could limit rationality in political and economical calculations. Culture persists in 
the face of changes in relative prices or formal rules (North 1990, p. 87).  It may not be rational to 
change transmitted and tested values without confirming that the changed relative prices will 
remain stable. If the majority of the population has not confirmed that this is so, such attempts to 
change culture are likely to arouse social conflict. But even if it has done so, the benefit from 
changes in culture or institutions needs to be compared with the costs, because it is costly to 
dismantle and recreate institutions or culture. Interest groups that benefit from the dominant culture 
will resist change, even when the majority wants it.  As a result, like a paradigm, culture does not 
change flexibly. The persistence of institutions or culture in the face of changes in relative prices or 
                                                 
15 Because the ancient Greek disdained commercial activities, trade was left to foreigners (Curtin 1984, 
pp. 75-8). As the Portuguese also held an anticommercial ideology, “[m]erchants were even further 
down the line in prestige, in spite of their wealth and occasional power” (ibid., p. 138). Similarly, despite 
contempt for merchants and commerce, there developed trade among the upper-class of ancient Rome 
(Walbank 1987, p. 74), among the Brahman caste of pre-industrial India (Curtin 1984, p. 103), and 
among the nobility of the Melaka kingdom (ibid., pp. 130-1). Based on “the evidence from the 
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century economies of China, India, and the Arab world,” Abu-Lughod (1989, 
pp. 363-4) “cast[s] doubt on [Max Weber’s] view that eastern culture provided an in hospitable 
environment for merchant-accumulations and industrial developers.”  
16 With regard to Japan, Reischauer (1970, pp. 92-3) for example, argues that “Hideyoshi and the 
Tokugawa had no particular objections to Christianity on religious grounds, but they looked upon it with 
deep suspicion as a political menace to their rule. They were desirous of retaining profitable trade 
relations with the Europeans, but gradually came to the conclusion to prohibit Christianity for reasons of 
national safety and political stability.”  
17 Joseon Wangjo Silok (朝鮮王朝實錄, The Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty), King Sejo 
13·8·kihae.   34
formal rules makes history path-dependent. Because Confucianism had been the dominant ideology 
in China and Korea for a very long time, the cultural inertia was very strong. 
 
 
VI.  The model’s implications for trade policies in the industrial period 
 
The theory of trade presented in this paper may appear to be a special case because it 
presupposes trade externalities, but I would argue that modern trade theory is the special case 
because it often ignores externalities.  Viewed from a broad perspective, economic acts have 
externalities; the economic domain and other domains are interrelated. This is why an 
interdisciplinary approach is needed.  
What is more, the theory presented here also possesses some explanatory power in 
accounting for trade policies in the industrial period. Following the compulsory opening up of 
China, Japan, and Korea to the modern world, these three countries became active in pursuing the 
gains from trade.  In terms of the model, a became bigger, because they came to know well the 
benefit of trade through the influx of Western knowledge, and because they were more keenly 
aware of the external competition. In addition, α1 became smaller, because Confucian ideology 
weakened and suzerainty worth defending disappeared.  
The model can also be applied to the trade between Socialist countries, which developed 
reciprocal trade amongst themselves but had little interest in trade with capitalist countries.  This 
socialist trade system resembled the tribute system under which trade was subject to diplomacy.  
Both attached great importance to the externalities of trade and developed official trade such as gift 
exchange that internalized externalities.  Similarly, many developing countries that were liberated 
from their colonial masters following the Second World War did not actively pursue the gains from 
trade because they were concerned that close trade relations with developed countries might restore 
their political and economic subordination. In other words, they judged α1 to be big. 
Even present protective agricultural trade policies in the developed countries can only be 
understood by considering the externalities from trade. Similarly, the policies of South Korea, 
China, Japan, and America with regard to trade with North Korea are strongly influenced by 
political consideration. 
However, the influence of externalities on trade has gradually weakened during the industrial 
period. Since around the turn of the new millennium, owing to the transformation of socialist 
economies into market economies, and the widening and deepening of globalization, we are   35
entering a period when neoclassical trade theory ignoring externalities provides a good explanation 
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Figure 1: Geographical Features of China: The North China Plain (華北平原),  
   a  Loess  (黃土) Area  
 
 
 